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Abstract
This paper examines the empirical signiﬁcance of learning, a type of adaptive,
boundedly rational expectations, in the U.S. economy within the framework of the
New Keynesian model with endogenous capital accumulation. Estimation results for
learning models can be sensitive to the choice for agents' initial expectations, so three
methods for choosing initial expectations are examined. Maximum likelihood results
show that learning under all methods do not signiﬁcantly improve the ﬁt the model.
The evolution of forecast errors show that the learning models do not out perform
the rational expectations model during the run-up of inﬂation in the 1970s and the
subsequent decline in the 1980s, a period of U.S. history which others have suggested
learning may play a role. Despite the failure of learning models to better explain the
data, analysis of the impulse response functions and paths of structural shocks during
the sample show that learning can lead to diﬀerent explanations for the data.
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1 Introduction
Rational expectations is one of the most common assumptions in dynamic macroeconomic
models. While it is usually made for mathematical convenience, the assumption regarding
expectations formation can have non-trivial eﬀects on a model's dynamics. In particular, a
large amount of literature has addressed the implications of least squares learning for popular
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Agents in a DSGE model that learn
do not know the parameters of the model, and instead form expectations by collecting past
data and compute least squares forecasts. In this paper I investigate statistical evidence
for learning within the framework of a New Keynesian monetary model and examine the
implications of incorporating learning on the predictions of the model
Recent papers have found that least squares learning can have important eﬀects on out-
put and inﬂation determination. Orphanides and Williams (2005b) use an estimated two
equation monetary model and demonstrate with simulations of impulse response functions
that least squares learning can lead to prolonged inﬂation following an inﬂation shock. Using
the same model, Orphanides and Williams (2005a) ﬁnd in another paper that learning on
the part of monetary policy can possibly explain the period of stagﬂation during the 1970s.
They suggest that the monetary authority was under-estimating the natural rate of unem-
ployment during this time, and was therefore responding too aggressively to unemployment
and not enough to inﬂation. They suggest that had the central bank responded to inﬂation
instead of unemployment, lower inﬂation and unemployment would have resulted. Primiceri
(2006) suggests that learning on the part of the central bank can explain both the run-up of
inﬂation during the 1970s and the subsequent decline during the 1980s. He suggests that the
monetary authority was under-estimating both the natural rate of unemployment and the
degree of inﬂation persistence. Like Orphanides and Williams (2005a), he shows the resulting
monetary policy leads to an increase in inﬂation, but as time progresses the central bank's
expectations evolve. The central bank's expectations of the natural rate of unemployment
and the degree of inﬂation persistence return their actual values and therefore the policy
prescription becomes stabilizing, resulting in the moderation that occurred from the middle
1980s onward.
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The results from these papers depend on a calibrated value for the constant learning gain,
a parameter that is responsible for the speed in which expectations evolve, and therefore
responsible for the impact learning can have on the dynamics of the model. Milani (2007)
is the ﬁrst paper to estimate the learning gain jointly with the parameters of a model. He
ﬁnds an estimate for the learning gain which is very close to calibrated values that are
popular in the literature. He estimates a standard three equation New Keynesian model and
ﬁnds evidence in U.S. data that learning explains persistence in output and inﬂation better
than habit formation and inﬂation indexation. Like the papers cited above, Milani makes
speciﬁc assumptions about the initial conditions of agents expectations. Many of the initial
conditions are set close to pre-sample ordinary least squares estimates. The exceptions are
the degree of inﬂation persistence, which he assumes is equal to zero, and the sensitivity of
output to inﬂation, which he assumes is higher than the pre-sample evidence.
The results of all of these studies depend on the assumptions for the initial conditions for
agents and/or central bank's expectations. These initial conditions are sometimes backed
by an economic justiﬁcation or an argument that such a set of initial conditions accounts
well for the data. In this paper, instead of suggesting a speciﬁc assumption for the initial
expectations of agents, I examine a number of alternative methods for forming these initial
conditions. These methods include using the rational expectations solution of the model and
using least-squares estimation results from pre-sample data.
I extend the analysis of the existing empirical learning literature, and incorporate learning
into a New Keynesian model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital and endogenous investment decisions,
a model introduced by Woodford (2005). There are a number of motivations for extending
the empirical analysis to the model with capital accumulation. Including capital in the model
introduces data on another variable, aggregate investment, to be included in the estimation
procedure. Secondly, introducing capital may alter how expectations are formed, since agents
may use past data on capital to make there forecasts. Also, incorporating capital introduces
more expectations into the model which may allow learning may play a bigger role. Finally,
in a rich model with stochastic shocks to preferences, technology, and investment, one can
determine the role learning has in the impact of such shocks, and the role the shocks play in
explaining U.S. data.
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Rational expectations and learning versions of the model are estimated by maximum
likelihood. The ﬁndings of this paper indicate the learning gain is statistically signiﬁcant
which implies a statistical evidence against the rational expectations hypothesis and statisti-
cal evidence that expectations are adaptive. Examination of the other parameter estimates
indicate that allowing for learning in the model can lead agents' consumption and investment
decisions to be less dependent on expectations. Furthermore, estimated impulse response
functions indicate that learning can lead to very diﬀerent eﬀects for the structural shocks
depending on the information agents use for forming their forecasts and depending on the
initial conditions for agents expectations at the beginning of the sample period. Despite
these diﬀerences, examination of in-sample and out-of-sample forecast errors ﬁnd that the
learning models do not out-perform the rational expectations model in explaining the data.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the details of the New Keynesian
model with and without capital. Section 3 describes the learning process and how learning
is incorporated into the model. Section 4 describes the maximum likelihood procedure and
the four cases for how initial conditions are constructed. Section 5 reports the results, and
section 6 concluded.
2 Model
The New Keynesian model has been used extensively in monetary economics for analysis
of theoretical and empirical issues and it is a convenient framework to examine the role of
learning on output, consumption, investment, and inﬂation determination. Woodford (2003)
provides a complete exposition of the model's micro-foundations, its many extensions, and
implications for monetary policy. The model used in this paper is an extension of the
standard three equation New Keynesian suggested by Woodford (2005) that incorporates
endogenous investment decisions in a framework of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital, where output is
produced under constant returns using both labor and ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital. Not only is
ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital a more realistic assumption than a perfect rental market for capital, but
Woodford shows that allowing for ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital alters the coeﬃcient on marginal cost
in the Phillips curve in such a way that allows for greater price ﬂexibility to be consistent
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with very small values of the coeﬃcient, which is often seen in empirical work, including this
paper.
The model has a continuum of consumers types on the unit interval, and a continuum
of intermediate goods producers on the unit interval, each producing a unique intermediate
good. Each consumer type possesses a speciﬁc labor skill that can only be hired by a
corresponding intermediate goods producer. It is assumed that there are many consumers in
each consumer type so that consumers do not have market power over the wage. Production
of intermediate goods may also depend on capital goods which are ﬁrm-speciﬁc. Since a
capital good in ﬁrm i cannot be used by another ﬁrm j, there is not a perfect capital rental
market which would equalize the marginal product of capital across intermediate good ﬁrms.
Therefore each ﬁrm's labor demand and pricing decision will depend on its current capital
stock, which in turn depends on the ﬁrm's entire past history.
All the intermediate goods are used to produce a single type of ﬁnal good, but they are
imperfect substitutes for each other in production; therefore intermediate goods producing
ﬁrms are monopolistically competitive. Prices of intermediate goods are imperfectly ﬂexible
according to Calvo's (1983) pricing mechanism where a constant fraction of ﬁrms is able to
re-optimize its price every period, and the ﬁrms selected to do so is randomly determined,
independently of ﬁrms' histories or characteristics. This setup for sticky prices may seem
unrealistic, but Roberts (1995) shows in a model without ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital that quadratic
price adjustment cost, an alternative pricing friction suggested by Rotemberg (1982), yields
the same solution as Calvo pricing. The same is not true with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital. Under
Calvo pricing, at any point in time, each ﬁrm will have a diﬀerent pricing history and there-
fore a diﬀerent capital stock. Each ﬁrm's relative capital stock will in turn aﬀect the pricing
decision. Under quadratic price adjustment costs, all ﬁrms face the same friction every
period, and so all ﬁrms price, labor, and investment decisions remain identical throughout
time. Therefore, even though Calvo pricing may seem to be an unrealistic setting, it is a
convenient framework to incorporate the realistic assumption of ﬁrm heterogeneity.
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2.1 Consumers
Each consumer type has a speciﬁc labor skill that can only be hired by a speciﬁc intermediate
goods producing ﬁrm. Since each intermediate goods ﬁrm has a diﬀerent labor demand,
wage income will be diﬀerent for each consumer type. Given a perfect asset market, though,
consumption will be equal across all consumers. Each consumer type i ∈ (0, 1) maximizes
utility,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
1
1− 1
σ
ξt (ct − ηct−1)1−
1
σ − 1
1 + µ
µtnt(i)
1+µ
]
, (1)
subject to the budget constraint,
ct + bt(i) =
1 + rt−1
1 + pit
bt−1(i) +
wt(i)
pt
nt(i) + Πt − τt (2)
where ct, consumption at time t, is not indexed by individual type i since it is equal across
all agents, ξt is an aggregate preference shock, nt(i) and wt(i)/pt are the labor supply and
real wage of individual i at time t, respectively, µt is an aggregate labor supply shock, bt(i)
is individual i's purchase of real government bonds at time t, rt is the nominal interest rate
paid on government bonds, pit is the inﬂation rate, Πt is the value of proﬁts earned by owning
stock in ﬁrms, and τt is the value of real lump sum taxes. The preference parameters are
σ ∈ (0,∞), which is the pseudo intertemporal-elasticity of substitution,1 η ∈ [0, 1), which
is the degree of habit formation, and µ ∈ (0,∞) which is the inverse of the elasticity of
labor supply. Appendix A shows that the ﬁrst order conditions for the consumer lead to the
log-linear Euler equation,
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 + rˆt − Etpit+1, (3)
where a hat indicates the percentage deviation of the variable from its steady state.2 Here,
λˆt is the marginal utility of real income, given by,
λˆt =
1
σ(1− βη)(1− η)
[
βηEtcˆt+1 − (1 + βη2)cˆt + ηcˆt−1
]
+
(
ξˆt − βηEtξˆt+1
)
. (4)
1When there is no habit formation and labor supply is ﬁxed, σ is exactly equal to the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution.
2A hat is omitted from inﬂation because, as Appendix A demonstrates, in order to derive the Phillips
curve it is necessary to assume the steady state inﬂation rate is equal to zero.
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I assume that the preference shock, ξˆt, follows the exogenous autoregressive process,
ξˆt = ρξ ξˆt−1 + ξ,t, (5)
where ξ,t is independently and identically with mean zero and variance given by σ
2
ξ .
When there is no habit formation, equations (3) and (4) lead to the standard IS equation,
cˆt = Etcˆt+1 − σ (rˆt − Etpit+1) + ξˆt.
Habit formation is added to the model, because as equation (4) demonstrates, habit for-
mation introduces a source of persistence that does not depend on learning. The larger is
the degree of habit formation, the more current period marginal utility depends on past
consumption. Since consumption is related to output in the market clearing condition, habit
formation creates output persistence. Moreover, Fuhrer (2000) ﬁnds that habit formation
leads to hump shaped impulse response functions, a phenomenon evident in the data.
2.2 Producers
There is one ﬁnal good used for consumption and investment which is sold in a perfectly
competitive market and produced with a continuum of intermediate goods. The production
function is given by,
yt =
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
(6)
where yt is the output of the ﬁnal good, yt(i) is intermediate good i, and θ ∈ (1,∞) is the
elasticity of substitution in production. Proﬁt maximization leads to the demand for each
intermediate good,
yt(i) =
[
pt(i)
pt
]−θ
yt, (7)
where pt(i) is the price of intermediate good i and pt is the price of the ﬁnal good. Substi-
tuting equation (7) into (6) leads to a consumption price index that holds in equilibrium,
pt =
[∫ 1
0
pt(i)
1−θdi
] 1
1−θ
. (8)
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2.2.1 Intermediate goods
The intermediate good is produced with labor and a unique type of capital good according
to the constant returns to scale production function,
yt(i) = ztkt(i)
αnt(i)
1−α (9)
where kt(i) is capital hired by ﬁrm i. For a given level of output, intermediate goods ﬁrms
choose labor demand and rent capital to minimize real total cost,
Ct =
wt(i)
pt
nt(i) + ρt(i)kt(i), (10)
where ρt(i) is the rental price of capital good i. Log-linearizing the production function
and summing over all intermediate goods ﬁrms leads to the log-linear aggregate production
function,
yˆt = zˆt + αkˆt + (1− α)nˆt. (11)
The appendix shows when ﬁrms hire optimal amounts of labor and capital, the average
marginal cost among all the intermediate goods ﬁrms (in terms of the percentage deviation
from the steady state) is given by,
sˆt =
1 + αµ
µ(1− α) yˆt −
α(µ+ 1)
µ(1− α) kˆt − λˆt −
µ+ 1
µ(1− α) zˆt, (12)
where kˆt is the percentage deviation of the aggregate capital stock from its steady state. The
technology shock is assumed to follow the exogenous stochastic process,
zˆt = ρz zˆt−1 + z,t, (13)
where z,t is independently and identically distributed with mean zero and variance given by
σ2z .
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2.2.2 Firm-speciﬁc capital goods
Capital goods ﬁrms maintain ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital stocks and rent the capital to the corre-
sponding intermediate goods ﬁrm at a real price of ρt(i) per unit of capital. This assumption
in not essential and is purely used for notational convenience. This model supposes that
the market for ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital is purely competitive, even though ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital
cannot be sold to other ﬁrms. This assumption assures an optimal amount of investment in
each ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital good which would be the same outcome if the intermediate goods
ﬁrms were to invest and own the capital themselves instead of renting it.
Capital goods ﬁrms purchase the ﬁnal good and convert it to a ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital good.
The conversion from a ﬁnal good to a ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital good is irreversible and is subject
to a stochastic shock, µt, that is common to all capital goods. Let It(i) denote the purchase
of the ﬁnal good for investment for capital good i, so that ιtIt(i) be the amount a purchase
of It(i) adds to the capital stock. The evolution of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital i is given as,
kt+1(i) = (1− δ)kt(i) + ιtIt(i)− φ
2
[
kt+1(i)
kt(i)
− 1
]2
kt(i) (14)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the capital depreciation rate and φ ∈ (0,∞) is a capital adjustment
cost parameter. When φ = 0, there is no adjustment cost and capital net of depreciation
increases by ιtIt(i). Log-linearizing equation (14) then integrating across all the ﬁrms leads
to the following relationship between capital and investment:
kˆt+1 = (1− δ)kˆt + δIˆt + διˆt (15)
Capital goods ﬁrms choose investment to maximize the expected utility value of proﬁts,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtλt [ρt(i)kt(i)− It(i)] , (16)
subject to equation (14). The appendix shows that proﬁt maximization leads to the following
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evolution of the aggregate capital stock:
λˆt + φ
(
kˆt+1 − kˆt
)
= β(1− δ)Etλˆt+1 +
(
1− β (1− δ)
µ(1− α)
) [
(µ+ 1)Etyˆt+1 − (µ+ α)kˆt+1
]
+βφ
(
Etkˆt+2 − kˆt+1
)
− (µ+ 1) [1− β (1− δ)]
µ(1− α) Etzˆt+1 + µˆt − β(1− δ)Etιˆt+1
+ [1− β(1− δ)]Etµˆt+1,
(17)
The investment shock is assumed to follow the stochastic process,
ιˆt = ριιˆt−1 + ι,t (18)
where ι,t is independently and identically distributed with mean zero and variance given by
σ2ι .
2.2.3 Phillips Curve
The Phillips curve is a single equation that describes the relationship between inﬂation and
output, as determined by the supply side of the economy when prices are sticky. The speciﬁc
price friction employed in this paper is Calvo (1983) pricing. According to this method, only
a random subset of intermediate goods ﬁrms are able to re-optimize their price in a given
period. Allowing for inﬂation indexation, those ﬁrms who are not able to re-optimize their
price may adjust their price by a fraction, γ, of the previous period's inﬂation rate. Let
ω ∈ (0, 1) denote the fraction of ﬁrms who are not able to change their prices each period.
Since the speciﬁc ﬁrms able to change their prices each period is randomly determined, ωT
is the probability a ﬁrm will not be able to change its price for T consecutive periods. A
ﬁrm who is able to change its price maximizes the following present discounted utility value
of proﬁts earned while the ﬁrm is unable to change its price again:
Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
λt+T
λt
{(
pt+T (i)
pt+T
)
yt+T (i)− S [yt+T (i)]
}
, (19)
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where S [yt+T (i)] is the real total cost function of producing yt+T (i) units, given optimal
decisions for labor and capital, and pt+T (i) is the ﬁrm's price in period t+ T , given the ﬁrm
has not yet been able to re-optimize its price. When there is a positive degree of inﬂation
indexation, this price is determined by,
log pt+T (i) = log pt+T−1(i) + γpit+T−1 (20)
Appendix A shows that the ﬁrms' optimal choices for prices in combination with equi-
librium in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital goods market leads to the following Phillips curve,
pit =
(
1
1 + βγ
)
(γpit−1 + βEtpit+1 + κsˆt) (21)
where κ decreases as ω, the degree of price stickiness, increases. The parameter κ is also a
function of other parameters of the model, but there is not a closed form expression for it.
Appendix A describes the full details of the derivation of the Phillips curve.
2.2.4 Monetary Policy
The nominal interest rate is determined jointly with output and inﬂation by monetary policy.
In this paper I assume the monetary authority follows a Taylor (1993) type rule where the
interest rate is set in response to expected output and inﬂation, with a preference for interest
rate smoothing, according to,
rˆt = ρrrˆt−1 + (1− ρr) (ψpiEtpit+1 + ψyEtyˆt+1) + r,t (22)
where ρr ∈ [0, 1) is a degree of interest rate smoothing desired by the monetary authority,
ψpi ∈ (0,∞) is the feedback on the interest rate to expected inﬂation, ψy ∈ (0,∞) is the
feedback on the interest rate to expected output, and r,t is an independently and identically
distributed exogenous monetary policy shock with mean zero and variance given by σ2r .
Alternative policy rules may replace expected inﬂation and output with current or lagged
realizations. McCallum (1997), for example, argues that a policy rule that depends on cur-
rent realizations of output and inﬂation is not operational. He suggests that using lagged
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realizations more accurately represent actual monetary policy since current quarter esti-
mates for output and price levels are not available. Under rational expectations with full
information, the policy rule above is also subject to this criticism. However, as will be seen
in the next section, under learning expectations are formed by collecting past data, so the
monetary policy rule above is operational.
2.3 Complete Model
The complete system has eight variables: consumption (cˆt), marginal utility of income (λˆt),
investment (Iˆt), capital stock (kˆt), marginal cost (sˆt), output (yˆt), labor (nˆt), inﬂation (pit),
and the interest rate (rˆt). The demand side of the model consists of the Euler equation,
(3), and the deﬁnition of the marginal utility of income, (4). The supply side of the model
consists of the Phillips curve, (21), the deﬁnition of the marginal cost, (12), the evolution
of capital, (17), the relationship between investment and capital, (15), and the production
function (11). The model is completed with the monetary policy rule, (22), and the following
log-linear goods market clearing condition,
yˆt = cy cˆt + δky Iˆt, (23)
where cy is the steady state consumption to output ratio and ky is the steady state capital
to output ratio. Appendix A shows that ky and cy are given by,
ky =
βα(θ − 1)
θ (1− β + βδ) ,
cy = 1− δky.
There are four exogenous shocks in the model: the preference shock, ξt, whose evolution
is given in equation (5); the technology shock, zt, whose evolution is given in equation (13);
the investment shock, µt, whose evolution is given in equation (18); and the monetary policy
shock, r,t.
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3 Learning
The speciﬁc type of adaptive learning process considered in this paper is least squares learn-
ing. Under least squares learning, agents form expectations by collecting past data and
computing least squares estimates. The speciﬁc type of least squares learning I use is con-
stant gain learning, which is consistent with agents' forecasts based on weighted least squares,
where more recent observations are given more weight, and the weights decline geometrically
with the age of the observations. This is a popular assumption in the learning literature and
is the same type of learning used by Orphanides and Williams (2005b) to explain inﬂation
scares, Primiceri (2006) to explain the inﬂation volatility in the 1970s, and Milani (2007) to
explain output and inﬂation persistence.
Constant gain least squares learning is arguably similar to how expectations are actually
formed in the U.S economy. Under some of the speciﬁcations of least squares learning
examined in this paper, agents in the model use exactly the same data that is available to
an econometrician, such as the output gap, the inﬂation rate, and the federal funds rate.
Least squares forecasts also often out-perform more complex economic models in out of
sample forecasts, and the welfare of individuals who make output, consumption, and savings
decisions depend on the accuracy of forecasts, and not the ability to identify parameters
of an econometric model, or the ability to make counter-factual predictions. These latter
qualities, found in structural economic models, are desirable mostly by policy makers. The
constant gain assumption can also be argued as realistic as it captures the idea that agents
agents believe changes in the economy are possible, so that agents view more recent data
as more likely to yield accurate forecasts than data from further in the past. I demonstrate
in the next section that constant gain least squares is equivalent to a very speciﬁc type of
weighted least squares which is not an actual popular estimation method. However, Evans
and Honkapohja (2001) suggest that constant gain least squares is a good approximation
for agents that use a rolling window of data. That is agents do not use all the data as
far back as possible, but form forecasts based on the most recent data for a given number
of observations. This is very close to common practice, as empirical studies that forecast
output and inﬂation typically use at most 50 years of data, despite annual data available
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from Johnston and Williamson (2007) for both these variables dating all they way back to
the year 1790.
There is also a theoretical and empirical appeal to using constant gain learning. The
theoretical appeal is that unlike with ordinary least squares, with weighted least squares the
eﬀects of learning persist in the long run. With ordinary least squares, as time progresses
agents obtain more and more observations and so their sample sizes approach inﬁnity. There-
fore, the eﬀect a single new observation has on the agents' estimation results disappears.
Constant gain learning instead assumes that a new observation carries the same weight ev-
ery period, regardless of how much time has progressed. The empirical appeal is that the
degree to which learning aﬀects the dynamics of the economy can be determined by esti-
mating a single parameter, the learning gain. Moreover, with appropriate initial conditions
for the learning process, constant gain learning nests the rational expectations framework,
where rational expectations is the special case where the learning gain is equal to zero.
Standard statistical tests that determine if a parameter is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
can determine the statistical signiﬁcance of learning, and formally reject or fail to reject the
assumption of rational expectations.
The log-linearized New Keynesian model in the previous section has the following general
form:
Ω0xt = Ω1xt−1 + Ω2E∗t xt+1 +Ψvt, (24)
vt = Avt−1 + t (25)
where xt is a vector of state variables (expressed as percentage deviations from their steady
state), E∗t refers to a possibly non-rational expectations operator, vt is a vector of structural
shocks, and t is a vector of independently and identically distributed innovations to the shock
process. In the New Keynesian model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital the state vector is given by,
x′t = [yˆt cˆt kˆt λˆt Iˆt nˆt sˆt pit rˆt], and the vector of shocks is given by, vt = [zˆt ιˆt ξˆt µˆt r,t]
The solution of the model can be written as,
xt = Gxt−1 +Hvt. (26)
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To agents that learn with a correctly speciﬁed model, the actual values in the matrices G and
H are unknown, but agents use the form of equation (26) to estimate future values of xt by
least squares. It is assumed that when agents begin period t, time t observations are not yet
realized; therefore agents collect observations up through time period t−1. From this agents
make least squares forecast, then make consumption, production, investment, and pricing
decisions based on these expectations. Only after these decisions are implemented, that is
at the end of time period t, do time t observations become available. This is both a realistic
and mathematically simplifying assumption. The latest numbers from statistical agencies
such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics are almost always at least one quarter old. It is of
great mathematical convenience, because the term E∗t xt+1 in equation (24) is then only a
function of observations through period t−1. Therefore, solving for xt in terms of past state
variables is straightforward. If instead E∗t xt+1 was a function of xt, non-linear numerical
methods would be needed to solve the model as least squares forecasts are non-linear.
To forecast xt+1, agents estimate G and H by least squares using as regressors variables
in the vector xt−1, and the shocks included in vt. Assuming agents have data available on
shocks is not very realistic, but this assumption can be dropped. In Section 4 I estimate the
models under both cases, so that when comparing the results from the learning and rational
expectations models, it will be clear what results derive from the learning process, and what
results derive from assuming that agents have a more limited information set.
Agents do not use all the variables in xt as regressors, only those that correspond to
non-zero columns in G. If an entire column in G is equal to zero, this implies that the past
observation in the associated element in xt−1 does not inﬂuence xt in the MSV solution. I
assume agents know the structural form of the economy and therefore use as explanatory
variables only the variables that have non-zero coeﬃcients inG. In the New Keynesian model,
the variables with non-zero coeﬃcients in G include consumption, capital, the inﬂation rate,
and the interest rate. The remaining variables in the model that are not used as explanatory
variables are output, labor, marginal cost, marginal utility of income, and investment. These
variables do not directly lead to any persistence and are simply non-stochastic linear functions
of the other variables of the model.
I assume agents also use a constant term in their least squares forecasts. The structural
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form of the model, (24), does not include a constant, but since this equation is written in
terms of percentage deviations from the steady state, using a constant in agents' estimation
equations implies agents do not know the steady state values of the economy.
Let Φt denote the time t estimate of the all the coeﬃcients to be estimated in the learning
process. These coeﬃcients include a vector of constants, the non-zero columns in G, and all
the columns in H in the case where shocks are used as explanatory variables. Let Yt denote
the time t dependent variables used in the learning process. Since time t data is not available
to agents, Yt = xt−1. Let Xt denote the vector of time t explanatory variables. If agents
include the stochastic shocks in their explanatory variables, X ′t = [1 x
′
t−2v
′
t−1], otherwise
X ′t = [1 x
′
t−2]. If agents estimate equation (26) by ordinary least squares, they form the
estimate,
Φ′t =
(
1
t− 1
t∑
τ=2
XτX
′
τ
)−1 (
1
t− 1
t∑
τ=2
XτY
′
τ
)
. (27)
The ordinary least squares estimate Φt can be rewritten into the convenient recursive
form:
Φt = Φt−1 + gt(Yt − Φt−1Xt)X ′tR−1t , (28)
Rt = Rt−1 + gt(XtX ′t −Rt−1), (29)
where gt = 1/(t − 1) is the learning gain.3 The recursive form demonstrates precisely how
expectations are adaptive. Agents take the previous period's estimates, Φt−1 and Rt−1, and
correct them according to the residual between the previous period's forecast and the new
observation. The amount of the correction depends on the learning gain. With ordinary
least squares and inﬁnite memory, the learning gain approaches zero as time approaches
inﬁnity, so the eﬀect new observations have on updating the beliefs of Φ and R diminish
as the number of observations already in the sample approaches inﬁnity. Constant gain
learning instead assumes that the learning gain gt remains constant over time. This allows
new observations to inﬂuence estimation results by the same weight throughout time. If the
constant gain is equal to zero, the estimate Φt remains at its initial value throughout time.
Given an initial value equal to the rational expectations solution, a zero constant learning
3To show this, let Rt = 1t−1
∑t
τ=2XτX
′
τ and Φ
′ = R−1t
(
1
t−1
∑t
τ=2XτY
′
τ
)
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gain implies rational expectations.
Let gˆ0,t denote the estimated constant term in Φt, and let Gˆt and Hˆt denote the time t
estimate of G and H, respectively, obtained from Φt. Agents' expectation of xt+1 is given
by,
E∗t xt+1 = gˆ0,t + GˆtE
∗
t xt + HˆEtvt+1 (30)
Note that equation (30) assumes that expectations about future shocks, vt+1, are rational.
This is a common simplifying assumption made in learning models. It is possible to allow
agents to also estimate the coeﬃcients in the shock process, but the dynamics deriving from
this additional complication are negligible. Since time t observations are not yet available to
agents, agents must also estimate xt by least squares. The time t estimate of xt is given by,
Etx
∗
t = gˆ0,t + Gˆtxt−1 + Hˆvt. (31)
Plugging this into equation (30) yields,
E∗t xt+1 = (I + Gˆt)gˆ0,t + Gˆ
2
txt−1 +
(
GˆtHˆt + HˆtA
)
vt. (32)
Plugging the agents' forecast, (32), into the structural form of the model, (24), leads to
the following actual law of motion for xt:
xt = Ω
−1
0 Ω2
(
I + Gˆt
)
gˆ0,t + Ω
−1
0
(
Ω1 + Ω2Gˆ
2
t
)
xt−1 + Ω−10
[
Ψ+ Ω2
(
GˆtHˆt + HˆtA
)]
vt. (33)
4 Estimation
4.1 Data
I estimate the model with quarterly U.S. data on real private consumption, real gross private
domestic investment, consumer price index inﬂation, and the eﬀective federal funds rate.
Data is collected for 1953:Q3 through 2008:Q1 from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
FRED database. Consumption and investment are put in per-capita terms by dividing the
series by data on the civilian non-institutional population which is obtained from the Bureau
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of Labor Statistics.
In the New Keynesian model, consumption and investment are expressed in terms of the
percentage deviation from their respective steady states. Since this data is non-stationary it
is ﬁrst de-trended by removing a common trend growth rate, similar to Ireland (2004a) and
Ireland (2004b). Even though productivity growth is not speciﬁed in the model, consumption
and investment should have the same long run growth rate. This growth rate is determined
by adding together consumption and investment, and taking the average growth rate over
the sample. The average quarterly growth rate of output computed this way is gy = 0.0054.
De-trended consumption and investment is therefore determined according to,
CONS∗t =
CONSt
(1 + gy)
t , INV
∗
t =
INVt
(1 + gy)
t ,
where CONSt and INVt are the raw data on consumption and investment, and CONS
∗
t
and INV ∗t denote the data with the trend growth rate removed.
4.2 Initial conditions
I estimate the model under four diﬀerent cases for how expectations are formed. Case 1 is
rational expectations, and the other cases are learning with diﬀerent assumptions for initial
expectations and what explanatory variables agents use to make their least squares forecasts.
Case 2 can be viewed as the closest to rational expectations. Agents learn according to
constant gain least squares, but the initial values for the learning matrices Φ and R are
equal to the rational expectations solution. Furthermore, agents have the same information
as agents with rational expectations, which means they include realizations of structural
shocks among the other explanatory variables. When the constant learning gain is equal to
zero, case 2 is equivalent to case 1.
Case 3 makes another incremental step away from rational expectations. Agents again
learn according to constant gain least squares, and their initial conditions for the learning
matrices are equal to the rational expectations values, but agents are not able to collect data
on past shocks in order to use them as explanatory variables.
Case 4 assumes the agents have the same information set as case 3, but the initial
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conditions for the learning process matrices are diﬀerent from the rational expectations
solution. The initial conditions are set equal to constant gain least squares estimates from
pre-sample data. This is similar to how Milani (2007) initializes the learning matrices, but
he uses estimates from a ﬁrst order vector autoregression using ordinary least squares, which
is consistent instead with a decreasing learning gain. In this paper, the initial conditions for
the learning process are consistent with the constant learning gain which is estimated jointly
with the other parameters of the model.
Equations (28) and (29) describe the least squares learning process with any given learn-
ing gain, gt. When the learning gain is constant, repeated substitution of these equations
can show that the coeﬃcient matrix is given by,
Φt =
(
t−1∑
τ=0
(1− g)tXt−τX ′t−τ
)−1 (t−1∑
τ=0
(1− g)tXt−τY ′t−τ
)
(34)
In the New Keynesian model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital, Y ′t = [cˆt−1 kˆt−1 pit−1 rˆt−1], and
X ′t = [1 cˆt−2 kˆt−2 pit−2 rˆt−2]. In this speciﬁcation of the model, some of the data agents use
are not directly observed by the econometrician. Consumption is expressed as percentage
deviations from the steady state, and capital stock is not directly observable. For a given
estimate of the consumption to output ratio and the steady state level of output, pre-sample
data on aggregate consumption is put in terms of the percentage deviation from the steady
state according to,
cˆt =
CONS∗t − cyy∗
cyy∗
, (35)
where cy is the steady consumption to output ratio, one of the New Keynesian model pa-
rameters to be estimated, and y∗ is the steady state level of output which will be calibrated,
as discussed in the next subsection.
The inﬂation rate is directly observable by the econometrician, but to make solving the
New Keynesian model tractable, it was assumed in Section 2 that the steady state inﬂation
rate is equal to zero. Since this is unlikely to be the case in the data, let pi∗ denote the
annualized steady state inﬂation rate, expressed as a percentage. Let INFt denote the
annualized quarterly inﬂation rate measured from CPI data. This data is mapped to pre-
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sample data for pit for agents in the model that form expectations by learning according
to,
pit =
1
400
(INFt − pi∗) . (36)
The steady state inﬂation rate, pi∗, will be among the parameters estimated in the maximum
likelihood procedure.
The interest rate in the model is also expressed as a deviation from its steady state. The
steady state real gross interest rate in the New Keynesian model is given by β−1. Let r∗
denote the annualized quarterly steady state inﬂation rate so that r∗ = 400(β−1 − 1). Let
FFt denote data on the annualized quarterly Federal Funds Rate. Pre-sample data on the
Federal Funds rate can therefore be transformed to pre-sample data for agents according to
rˆt =
1
400
(FFt − r∗ − pi∗) . (37)
Data for the U.S. capital stock is diﬃcult to measure, but using the New Keynesian
model, data for percentage deviation of capital from its steady state level can be composed
from data on the deviation of investment from its steady state level. Recall equation (15)
describes the evolution of the capital stock in terms of the percentage deviation from the
steady state:
kˆt+1 = (1− δ)kˆt + δIˆt + διˆt. (38)
For a given initial value for kˆt in the pre-sample, a simulated path for the investment shock,
ιˆt, and pre-sample data on the percentage deviation of investment from the steady state,
Iˆt, a pre-sample series of kˆt can be constructed. Investment in the model is expressed as a
percentage deviation from its steady state. Similar to consumption data, pre-sample data
on gross private domestic investment can be transformed to pre-sample data for Iˆt according
to,
Iˆt =
INV ∗t − (1− cy)y∗
(1− cy)y∗ , (39)
where (1− cy)y∗ is the steady state level of investment.
I suppose at the beginning of the pre-sample capital is equal to its steady state value so
that the pre-sample initial value for kˆt is set equal to zero. The investment shock series is
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generated equation (18) given the variance of the investment shock, σ2ι , which is estimated
along with the rest of the parameters of the model in the maximum likelihood procedure.
Pre-sample quarterly data is collected for 1954:Q3 through 1969:Q4 and is transformed
to pre-sample data for cˆt, kˆt, pit, and rˆt according to equations (35), (36), (37), (38), (18),
and (39). The initial condition for Φ0 is then computed using equation for the weighted least
squares procedure, equation (34).
4.3 Maximum Likelihood Procedure
I estimate the model by maximum likelihood following the Kalman ﬁlter procedure outlined
in chapter 13 of Hamilton (1994). This procedure involves rewriting the model into state
space form. The state equation is a linear equation describing the entire New Keynesian
model including the learning mechanism. The equations governing the state are the actual
law of motion for xt, given in equation (33), and the evolution of the structural shocks given
in equation (25). Equation (33) can be rewritten more compactly as,
xt = bt + Ftxt−1 +Mtvt, (40)
where vector bt and matrices Ft and Mt are given by,
bt = Ω
−1
0 Ω2
(
I + Gˆt
)
gˆ0,t,
Ft = Ω
−1
0
(
Ω1 + Ω2Gˆ
2
t
)
,
Mt = Ω
−1
0
[
Ψ+ Ω2
(
GˆtHˆt + HˆtA
)]
This equation can be combined with equation (25) into the single state equation,
x∗t = b
∗
t + F
∗
t x
∗
t−1 + 
∗
t , (41)
where x∗t = [x
′
t v
′
t]
′ and,
F ∗t =
 Ft MtA
0 A
 ,
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b∗t =
 bt
0
 ,
∗t =
 Mtt
t
 .
The variance of ∗t is given by,
V ar(∗t ) =
 MtΣM ′t MtΣ
ΣM ′t Σ
 ,
where Σ is a diagonal matrix with the variance of the structural shocks along the diagonal.
The observations equations are given by,
CONS∗t = cyy
∗ + cyy∗cˆt
INV ∗t = (1− cy)y∗ + (1− cy)y∗Iˆt
INFt = pi
∗ + 400pit
FFt = pi
∗ + 400 (rn + rˆt) ,
(42)
The likelihood is maximized with respect to the following vector of parameters,
Θ2 = [η σ µ cy φ γ ρr ψy ψpi ρz ρι ρξ σz σι σξ σr pi
∗ g].
Several parameters are calibrated instead of estimated. The discount factor, β, is set equal
to 0.9925 which corresponds to a steady state real interest rate approximately equal to 3%.
The depreciation rate, δ, is set equal to 0.025 which corresponds to an approximate annual
depreciation rate of 10%.
The steady state level of output y∗ is set equal to the average of CONS∗t + INV
∗
t over
the sample and pre-sample period, which is computed to be y∗ = 14, 355. This is the
average de-trended estimate for real per-capita output, when considering only investment and
consumption and ignoring other spending that contributes to real GDP such as government
spending and net exports.
Preliminary estimation results led to unreasonably low values for κ, the slope on the
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Phillips curve that depends on the degree of price ﬂexibility, and α, the capital-share of
income. Ireland (2004b) also reports diﬃculty in obtaining sensible estimates for the Phillips
curve slope using maximum likelihood, calibrates this parameter to κ = 0.1. Smets and
Wouters (2005) in very rich New Keynesian with capital accumulation report diﬃculty in
estimating the capital-share of income and calibrate it to α = 0.24. I follow each of these
papers and use the calibrations.
Finally, data on total hours of labor is not used in the estimation procedure, so the labor
supply shock µˆt is suppressed, which leaves ρµ and σµ out of the estimation.
5 Results
5.1 Parameter Estimates
The parameter estimates for the four cases for expectations formation are given in Table 1.
In this subsection I look at each case in turn.
Case 1: Rational Expectations
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 1 show the parameter results for rational expectations. The
parameter estimates for the sources of persistence are markedly low. The estimate for degree
of habit formation is η = 0.1060, the estimate for the degree of price indexation is γ = 0.3624,
and the estimate of the degree of monetary policy persistence is ρr = 0.1945. These are quite
small compared to much of the empirical literature for dynamic macroeconomic models. For
example, for U.S. data, Smets and Wouters (2005) ﬁnd a degree of habit formation equal to
0.69 and a degree of price indexation equal to 0.66. Milani (2007) also predicts signiﬁcant
degrees for these sources of persistence, but only when estimating his model under rational
expectations.
Some empirical work ﬁnds similar evidence for weak sources of persistence. Ireland
(2004b) estimates by maximum likelihood a three equation New Keynesian model that is
augmented with sources of persistence for output and inﬂation and ﬁnds estimates of these
parameters statistically insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Cogley and Sbordone (2005)
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estimate the Phillips curve side of the model and ﬁnd a median estimate for the degree of
inﬂation indexation equal to zero. Despite the weak evidence for persistence from habit
formation and price indexation, the persistence in the structural shocks in the model are all
very signiﬁcant. All these estimates are in excess of 0.9, and strongly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero.
The estimated intertemporal elasticity of substitution is approximately equal to σ =
0.1603, which is rather small compared to others ﬁndings. For example, Smets and Wouters
(2005) estimate the inverse elasticity equal to 1.62, implying the elasticity is approximately
0.61. Giannoni and Woodford (2003) ﬁnd a similar estimate of 0.66. The estimate of this
parameter may depend crucially on the assumed expectations mechanism since it measures
the response of current period consumption decisions to changes in the expected real interest
rate. This matter is further examined with Cases 2, 3 and 4 below.
The point estimate for the inverse elasticity of labor supply is approximately µ = 30.67
which implies labor supply is very inelastic. One place in the model this parameter enters is
in the evolution of capital stock implied by the optimal investment decision, given in equation
(17). This equation illustrates that large values for µ imply relatively small responses in kt+1,
and therefore current period's optimal choice for investment, to changes in expectations for
future output and future technology shocks. Due to the relationship of this parameter and
expectations, the estimate of this parameter is also possibly dependent on the assumed
expectations mechanism.
The estimate for the cost of capital adjustment is equal to 7.68. This is relatively close
to the ﬁnding in Smets and Wouters (2005) and the calibration used in Woodford (2005).
Dividing every term in equation (17) illustrates that this parameter also measures how
responsive investment decisions are to changes in expectations. The larger is the cost of
adjusting capital, the less responsive is investment to changes in expected output, expected
technology shocks, and expected investment shocks.
Finally the monetary policy parameters indicate a strong response of the Federal Funds
rate to expected inﬂation, ψpi = 2.1212, and virtually no response to the deviation of ex-
pected output from its steady state, ψy = 0.0000. The more than one-to-one response of the
Federal Funds rate to inﬂation is a common ﬁnding in the literature using data during the
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Volcker-Greenspan period after 1982. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) ﬁnd evidence that the
response was smaller before this period, but since the sample period for this paper begins in
1970, most of the sample is data from a period where U.S. monetary policy is widely viewed
as aggressively targeting inﬂation to promote macroeconomic stability. The absent response
to output is somewhat diﬀerent than what is found in the literature. Smets and Wouters
(2005) use a more rich speciﬁcation for the Taylor rule and ﬁnd a similar weak response to
current output, but a stronger response to lagged output.
Case 2: Learning with RE Initial Conditions
The next two columns of Table 1 show the results for learning when agents expectations
at the beginning of the sample are set equal to the rational expectations solution, and agents
use data on all the shocks to form their expectations, which is the same information set for
rational expectations. Rational expectations is the special case when the learning gain, g, is
equal to zero.
The point estimate for the learning gain for Case 2 is 0.0240 and is statistically signif-
icantly diﬀerent from zero, which implies signiﬁcant statistical evidence to reject the null
hypothesis that expectations are rational. This is close to commonly calibrated values in
the learning literature, for example Primiceri (2006) uses a calibration equal to 0.015 and
Orphanides and Williams (2005b) uses a value of 0.05. This is also very close to Milani's
(2007) estimate of 0.018.
While constant gain learning implies that agents use weighted least squares with a pos-
sibly indeﬁnitely large sample, Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and Sargent (1999) among
others have suggested that constant gain learning should closely resemble learning with or-
dinary least squares in which agents use a rolling window of approximately 1/g observations,
since the additional weight given to a new observation in such a framework is also constant
and equal to g. With this interpretation of the learning gain, the parameter estimate implies
that agents look at data from the last 41.6 quarters, or almost 10.5 years.
Three parameter estimates, those for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σ),
the inverse elasticity of labor supply (µ), and the cost of capital adjustment (φ), are very
diﬀerent from Case 1. All these parameters move in the direction that causes consumption
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and investment decisions to be less responsive to changes in expectations. The estimate for
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is approximately σ = 0.0513 which is about one
third the size of the estimate under rational expectations. This implies that learning leads
to the prediction that consumption decisions are less responsive to changes in the expected
real interest rate.
The estimate for the inverse elasticity of labor supply is µ = 0.0499, markedly diﬀerent
from the estimate under rational expectations. This implies a very elastic labor supply, and
therefore a much smaller response in investment decisions to changes in expected future
output and technology shocks. The direction for this diﬀerent ﬁnding is intuitive. Given
the ﬁnding that learning models predict agents decisions are less responsive to changes in
expectations, changes in investment decisions will be less responsive if labor supply is elastic,
since then ﬁrms can respond by changing their hiring decisions with relatively small changes
in the real wage.
The estimated cost of capital adjustment is approximately φ = 24.8826, much higher
than predicted by rational expectations. Since adjusting capital is relatively more expensive,
investment decisions are less responsive to changes in expectations about output, technology
shocks, and investment shocks.
Finally, this learning framework implies a lesser monetary policy response to expected
inﬂation, and a larger response to expected output. The ﬁnding that monetary policy is
more responsive to output in the learning framework is related to Smets and Wouters (2005)
ﬁnding that monetary policy responds more to lagged output than concurrent output. Mc-
Callum (1997) also argues that it is more realistic to suppose the monetary authority only
has information on lagged output. Under learning, agents collect information up through
the previous period, therefore expectations of future output depend completely on past data
of output, not on current realizations.
Case 3: Learning with RE Initial Conditions and Unobservable Shocks
The next two columns of table 1) show the estimation results when agents learn, but
with a more limited information set than cases 1 and 2. In case 3 agents do not collect data
on past realizations of structural shocks to use for explanatory variables in their forecasts.
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For the ﬁrst period in the sample, the coeﬃcients on the remaining explanatory variables
are initialized to the rational expectations solution.
The estimate for the learning gain is approximately g = 0.0236 and is again statisti-
cally signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This does not imply a formal rejection of rational
expectations as before, since the rational expectations framework is no longer a special case,
but it does imply statistical evidence that expectations are adaptive. The estimate for the
learning gain implies that agents use approximately 42.4 past quarters of data to form their
expectations, or about 10.5 years.
Some notable diﬀerences in the estimates from the previous expectations frameworks
again include the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the inverse elasticity of labor sup-
ply, and cost of adjusting capital. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is even smaller
than the previous two cases, which means this framework for learning predicts an even smaller
response of consumption decisions to changes in the expected real interest rate.
The estimate for the inverse of labor supply is µ = 2.0877 which implies labor is inelas-
tic. This is still far below the estimate under rational expectations, but much larger than
the estimate under the learning framework in case 2. Therefore when not supposing that
agents observe structural shocks to form their expectations, investment decisions are more
sensitive to changes in expected future output relative to when agents do collect data on
structural shocks. When agents only use past data on observable macroeconomic variables,
current period shocks have no inﬂuence on expectations, so agents forecasts should be less
volatile. Given a less volatile series for expectations, it is expected that an equivalent change
in expectations should have a larger impact on agents' decisions than with more volatile
expectations that is predicted when agents do observe shocks. Such an explanation is con-
sistent with the larger estimate for µ, but possibly contradicts the ﬁnding that the estimate
for σ is smaller. The estimate for the standard deviation of the preference shock is much
higher in Case 3 than Cases 1 and 2. This causes consumption decisions to be more volatile
which likely inﬂuences the estimate for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
The estimate for the cost of adjusting capital is approximately φ = 26.83, which is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than under case 2, but still signiﬁcantly greater than the estimate un-
der rational expectations.
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Case 4: Learning with Pre-Sample Initial Conditions
The ﬁnal learning framework assumes agents have the same information set as Case
3, but initial conditions for the learning matrices are set equal to weighted least squares
estimates obtained from pre-sample data. The estimate for the learning gain is approxi-
mately g = 0.0381, which is slightly larger than the previous estimates. This again suggests
statistical evidence than expectations are adaptive. This estimate implies that agents use
approximately 26.25 quarters, or about 6.5 years, of past data to form their forecasts.
The estimate for the elasticity of substitution is approximately σ = 0.1220 which is
not very diﬀerent than predicted under rational expectations. However, the estimate for
elasticity of labor supply and cost of adjusting capital tell a similar story as Case 2. Relative
to rational expectations, this framework for learning implies investment decisions are much
less responsive to changes to changes in expectations for future output.
5.2 Performance Comparison
The top part of Table 2 reports the in-sample root mean squared error (RMSE) of the resid-
uals, that is the one-period ahead forecast errors for consumption, investment, inﬂation, and
the federal funds rate. The table shows no clear improvement in performance by including
learning in the model. The expectations framework that best described consumption and
inﬂation is the learning model with observable shocks. The framework that best describes
investment is the learning model with unobservable shocks. The framework that best de-
scribes the federal funds rate is rational expectations, yet the RMSE for the federal funds
rate is very close across the ﬁrst three cases. Case 4, learning with initial expectations based
on pre-sample data, is the worst performing model for consumption, investment, and the
federal funds rate; and is the second worst performing model for the inﬂation rate.
The bottom part of table 2 shows the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation for the squared residu-
als. If the New Keynesian model is correctly speciﬁed, and accurately captures the run-up
of macroeconomic volatility in the 1970s and the subsequent decline after 1982, one would
expect no autocorrelation in the residuals. Cases 1, 2, and 3 show autocorrelation insignif-
icantly diﬀerent from zero for the volatility in consumption and investment residuals. This
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suggests the New Keynesian model with ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital can adequately explain the
dynamics of these variables under learning or rational expectations. However, in Cases 1,
2, and 3, the autocorrelation for the volatility in the inﬂation rate and federal funds rate
residuals are signiﬁcantly positive, which implies the models do not accurately capture the
changing volatility in the data for inﬂation or monetary policy.
These results ﬂip for Case 4. Here there is insigniﬁcant autocorrelation in the volatility
for inﬂation and the federal funds rate residuals, but a higher degree of autocorrelation for
the volatility of consumption and investment residuals.
To better understand what the relative performance of each expectations framework over
the sample period, Figure 1 shows the plots the each series of forecast errors. Periods of
recession in U.S. history are shaded. The number in parentheses is the correlation of the
series of forecast errors of the respective learning model with the series predicted under
rational expectations. The forecast errors for all four variables for Cases 2 and 3 are highly
correlated with rational expectations. The largest forecast errors are made during the 1970s
and early 1980s, a period many agree was marked by excessive macroeconomic volatility.
The largest forecast errors for the federal funds rate are made just after 1980 when Paul
Volcker became chairman of the Federal Reserve and began to aggressively counter-act very
high levels of inﬂation.
The forecast errors under Case 4 are signiﬁcantly less correlated with the rational expec-
tations case, but it tells the same qualitative story. The model makes the largest forecast
errors for consumption, investment, and inﬂation during the 1970s and early 1980s.
To get a further understanding of the relative performance of each model I next examine
how they compare in out-of-sample extended forecasts. To do this I ﬁrst estimate the model
using the sub-sample 1970:Q1 through 1989:Q4, then use this set of parameters to make
out-of-sample extended forecasts for forecast horizons 1 period ahead through 12 periods
ahead for the remainder of the sample, 1990:Q1 through 2008:Q1. Figure 2 shows the
RMSE's for consumption, investment, inﬂation and the federal funds rate for each of the
four expectations frameworks. The horizontal axis is the forecast horizon and the vertical
axis is the root mean squared error. The vertical axis is logarithmic in order for the RMSE's
for each expectations framework to show nicely on each graph.
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The results from Figure 2 show the rational expectations model performs nearly as well
out-of-sample as most of the learning models. The worst performing model for investment,
inﬂation, and the federal funds rate is Case 2, the learning model arguably closest to ra-
tional expectations. Recall, in this framework agents include data on structural shocks to
form their forecasts, and expectations at the beginning of the sample are set equal to the
rational expectations solution. In this framework the learning matrices, Φt and Rt evolve
with realizations of the shock processes. Under rational expectations, agents expectations
also depend on structural shocks, but the learning matrices are constant throughout time,
equal to the rational expectations solution. Out-of-sample forecasts for the structural shocks
generate imprecise forecasts for the learning matrices, and therefore poor out-of-sample fore-
casts. This result would not be expected for a learning gain very close to zero. If the learning
gain were very small, the learning gain matrices would be very slow to evolve.
5.3 Structural Shocks
Despite the similar performance of the four models for in-sample and out-of-sample forecast
errors, the choice for how expectations are formed makes a diﬀerence for predictions for
the structural shocks. Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 show the impulse responses to consumption,
investment, inﬂation, and the interest rate for each shock under each of the expectations
frameworks.
Impulse responses for learning models depend on the values of the learning matrices Φt
and Rt at the time of the impulse. The impulse response functions computed in this paper
are for the state of the learning matrices at the ﬁrst quarter of 2008, the last period of the
sample. If the learning matrices are not equal to the rational expectations solution, then
even in the absence of shocks the state variables evolve as expectations converge to the
rational expectations solution. Therefore, to expose only the impact of the shocks, the plots
in Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 show the diﬀerence between the evolution of the variables after the
shock and the evolution the variables would take in the absence of any shocks.
The ﬁgures show persistent impacts on consumption, investment, and the interest rate
from preference, technology, and investment shocks under rational expectations. In Case
2 the shocks cause large, long lasting, oscillatory eﬀects on investment, inﬂation, and the
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interest rate. This oscillatory behavior is likely what causes the large out-of-sample forecast
errors for Case 2. The ﬁgures show when expectations are initialized based on pre-sample
data (Case 4), the responses to the four shocks also cycle back and forth but are much more
jagged, more volatile, but shorter lasting.
When agents do have data on structural shocks, the eﬀects of structural shocks can have
opposite impacts as when agents do observe structural shocks. For example, the ﬁrst and
second rows of Figure 3 show when there is a positive preference shock and agents can
observe the shock, and therefore recognize that it is temporary, the interest rate increases in
response to the increase in consumption and investment decreases. In Case 3 where agents
learn and do not observe the shock, the increase in consumption demand causes agents to
expect permanently higher consumption and therefore increase investment.
Figure 5 shows when there is a positive investment shock, in Case 2 there is an increase
in investment demand as agents expect investment to be more productive. In Case 3, agents
cannot view the shock and so do not initially expect investment to be more productive. The
shock does cause an unexpected increase in the capital stock which decreases the marginal
product of capital and therefore decreases the demand for investment.
Figure 6 shows the impact of a contractionary monetary policy shock. In Cases 1 and 2
when agents observe the monetary policy shock, the demand for consumption and investment
decrease. When agents do not observe the shock, the stochastic behavior of the interest rate
causes agents to alter their expectations for the behavior of monetary policy. The supply
for output increases causing an increase in consumption and investment and a decrease in
inﬂation. The negative response to inﬂation then causes the monetary authority to actually
decrease the interest rate after the initial positive shock.
To understand how these impulse responses inﬂuence the predictions of the model, Figure
7 shows the smoothed estimates4 for the evolution of the structural shocks over the sample
period. Again, periods of U.S. recession are shaded and the number in parentheses is the
correlation of each shock with the prediction under rational expectations. The evolution of
the preference shock under Cases 1, 2, and 3 are all very similar. In each of these cases
the preference shock is near is lowest during the 1980 and 1981 recessions. Other than
4Kalman ﬁlter smoothing is computed using the techniques described in de Jong (1989).
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this instance, the preference shock seems to have little correlation with onset of recessions.
The same is not true for Case4. The preference shock under Case 4 is completely uncor-
related with the prediction under rational expectations, and shows only small dips during
recessionary periods.
The evolution of the technology shocks in Cases 3 and 4 are highly correlated with the
rational expectations prediction, but the Case 2 evolution of technology shocks is completely
uncorrelated. Recall from Figure 4 that in Case 2, technology shocks cause long-lived oscilla-
tory behavior in consumption, investment, and inﬂation, whereas under rational expectations
and Case 3, the responses of these variables are in one direction and long lived. Despite the
lack of correlation in the technology shock in Case 2, all cases have a similar qualitative
story. All recessionary periods are marked by low realization of the technology shock. The
diﬀerence in Case 2 is that the drop in the technology shock actually precedes the recessions,
instead of dropping during the recessions as in other cases. In fact from 1980 through 1982
the technology shock is actually recovering in Case 2, but remaining low in all the other
frameworks.
The evolution of the investment shock is very diﬀerent among the four cases. Under
rational expectations, the recessions in the early 1980s are characterized by large positive
investment shocks. Recall from Figure 5 that a positive investment shock under rational
expectations causes a negative response to consumption and a positive response to invest-
ment, inﬂation, and the interest rate. These responses are consistent with the United States
experience during the late 1970s and early 1980s, a period marked by high unemployment
and high inﬂation, and a time when monetary policy began to drastically increase the federal
funds rate in response to high inﬂation. The same is not true for Case 2. Figure 5 shows
that consumption responds positively to an investment shock, the initial positive response
to investment is much larger, and the responses to investment and inﬂation are shorter lived.
The evolution of the investment shock therefore looks somewhat diﬀerent over the sample
period. The investment shock still reaches peaks during this time, but it is not as dramatic
as under rational expectations.
The evolution of the investment shock in Cases 3 and 4 are similar to each other, but
very diﬀerent from Cases 1 and 2. Here the recessions in the early 1980s are characterized
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by negative investment shocks. When agents do not use structural shocks to form their
expectations, Figure 5 shows that positive investment shocks lead to a drop in inﬂation, a
sustained positive response to consumption, and a fall in the interest rate.
6 Conclusion
Constant gain learning is not found to not signiﬁcantly out-perform rational expectations in
the context of a standard Keynesian model that is extended to account for endogenous ﬁrm-
speciﬁc capital accumulation. Three diﬀerent learning frameworks are examined that diﬀer
based on the initial conditions for agents' expectations and the information set available to
agents when making their forecasts. The models are estimated by maximum likelihood and
the results indicate that learning provides minimal to no improvement in the ﬁt of the model
to U.S. data. When the learning procedure is initialized using least squares estimation results
from pre-sample data, the model actually performs the worst as measured by in-sample
forecast errors. Out-of-sample extended forecast errors show the worse performing model
is the learning framework in which agents do have information on all structural shocks and
expectations at the beginning of the sample are set equal to rational expectations. Despite
the mixed results for the ﬁt for the various models to the data, this paper does ﬁnd a constant
learning gain statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in all cases, which implies statistical
evidence that expectations are not rational and are adaptive.
Impulse response functions and smoothed estimates of the structural shocks reveal that
each expectations framework provides very diﬀerent explanations for the impacts a struc-
tural shock can have and therefore each model predicts diﬀerent evolutions for the structural
shocks over the sample period. The impulse response functions show when agents learn and
have data on structural shocks, there can be long-lived oscillatory eﬀects on consumption,
investment, and inﬂation. When agents do not observe the structural shocks, some of the
impulse responses are reversed. These diﬀerent responses to structural shocks lead to diﬀer-
ent evolutions for the structural shocks over the sample period, especially for the technology
and investment shocks.
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Appendix A Derivation of New Keynesian model
A.1 Consumers
Consumers choose consumption, ct, labor supply, nt(i), and purchases of bonds, bt(i), to
maximize utility, given in equation (1), subject to the budget constraint, given in equation
(2). The ﬁrst order conditions are,
λt = ξt (ct − ηct−1)−
1
σ − βηEtξt+1 (ct+1 − ηct)−
1
σ
µtnt(i)
1
µ = λt
wt(i)
pt
λt = βEtλt+1
1 + rt
1 + pit+1
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint and therefore the marginal
utility of real income. Log-linearizing the ﬁrst order conditions yields,
λˆt =
1
σ(1− βη)(1− η)
[
βηEtcˆt+1 − (1 + βη2)cˆt + ηcˆt−1
]
+
(
ξˆt − βηEtξˆt+1
)
(A1)
wˆt(i)− pˆt = 1
µ
nˆt(i)− λˆt + µˆt (A2)
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 + rˆt − Etpit+1 (A3)
where a hat indicates the percentage deviation of the variable from its steady state. Equa-
tion (A2) will be referenced later to express equilibrium real wages in terms of employment.
Equations (A3) and (A1) together implicitly deﬁne the log-linear Euler equation which de-
termines consumers' demand for ﬁnal goods.
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A.2 Producers
A.2.1 Final goods ﬁrms
The ﬁnal goods ﬁrm chooses its demand for intermediate good i to maximize proﬁts,
Πt = pt
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1 −
∫ 1
0
pt(i)yt(i)di
The ﬁrst order condition leads to the demand for intermediate good i,
yt(i) =
[
pt(i)
pt
]−θ
yt. (A4)
which is given in equation (7).
A.2.2 Input choices
Intermediate goods ﬁrms choose labor demand and rent capital to minimize real total cost,
given in equation (10), subject to the production function, given in equation (9). The ﬁrst
order conditions are,
wt(i)
pt
= (1− α)st(i) yt(i)
nt(i)
, (A5)
ρt(i) = αst(i)
yt(i)
kt(i)
, (A6)
where st(i) is the Lagrange multiplier on the production function. The Lagrange multiplier
is interpreted as the change in the objective function from a marginal ease in the constraint.
In this case the objective function is total cost and the constraint is total output, so the
Lagrange multiplier is equal to the marginal cost.
Log-linearizing the ﬁrst order conditions yields,
ρˆt(i) = sˆt(i) + yˆt(i)− kˆt(i), (A7)
wˆt(i)− pˆt = sˆt(i) + yˆt(i)− nˆt(i), (A8)
Combining these two equations to eliminate sˆt(i) and substituting equation (A2) to eliminate
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wages and prices leads to the expression for the rental rate of capital,
ρˆt(i) =
(
µ+ 1
µ
)
nˆt(i)− kˆt(i)− λˆt + µˆt. (A9)
The production function can now be used to express the rental rate of capital only in terms
of output and capital. The log-linear production function is given by,
yˆt(i) = zˆt + αkˆt(i) + (1− α)nˆt(i). (A10)
Solving equation (A10) for nˆt(i) and substituting this into (A9) yields,
ρˆt(i) =
µ+ 1
µ(1− α) yˆt(i)−
µ+ α
µ(1− α) kˆt(i)− λˆt + µˆt −
µ+ 1
µ(1− α) zˆt (A11)
Solving equation (A7) for sˆt(i) and using equation (A11) to substitute out ρˆt(i) leads to the
expression for marginal cost for ﬁrm i,
sˆt(i) =
1 + αµ
µ(1− α) yˆt(i)−
α(µ+ 1)
µ(1− α) kˆt(i)− λˆt + µˆt −
µ+ 1
µ(1− α) zˆt (A12)
Summing over all the ﬁrms leads to the average marginal cost in the economy,
sˆt =
1 + αµ
µ(1− α) yˆt −
α(µ+ 1)
µ(1− α) kˆt − λˆt + µˆt −
µ+ 1
µ(1− α) zˆt (A13)
Subtracting equation (A13) from equation (A12), leads to an expression for the marginal
cost of ﬁrm i in terms of the average marginal cost and the ﬁrms relative output and capital
stock,
sˆt(i) = sˆt +
1 + αµ
µ(1− α) [yˆt(i)− yˆt]−
α(µ+ 1)
µ(1− α) k˜t(i) (A14)
where k˜t(i) = kˆt(i)− kˆt is the relative capital stock of ﬁrm i.
A.2.3 Capital goods ﬁrms
Capital goods ﬁrms maximize the utility value of proﬁts, given in equation (16), subject
to the evolution of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital stock, given in equation (14). Instead of explicitly
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computing the proﬁt maximizing choice of investment, one can solve the evolution of capital
for It(i) and substitute this into the objective function. The ﬁrst order condition is,
λt
ιt
[
1 + φ
(
kt+1(i)
kt(i)
− 1
)]
=
βEt
λt+1
ιt+1
ιt+1ρt+1(i) + (1− δ) + φ
(
kt+2(i)
kt+1(i)
− 1
)
kt+2(i)
kt+1(i)
− φ
2
(
kt+2(i)
kt+1(i)
− 1
)2 .
(A15)
Log-linearizing this yields,
λˆt + φ
(
kˆt+1(i)− kˆt(i)
)
= Etλˆt+1 + [1− β (1− δ)]Etρˆt+1(i)
+βφ
(
Etkˆt+2(i)− kˆt+1(i)
)
+ ιˆt − β(1− δ)Etιˆt+1.
(A16)
Plugging equation (A11) into (A16) leads to the following equilibrium condition for the
evolution of capital stock for ﬁrm i:
λˆt + φ
(
kˆt+1(i)− kˆt(i)
)
= β(1− δ)Etλˆt+1
+
(
1− β (1− δ)
µ(1− α)
) [
(µ+ 1)Etyˆt+1(i)− (µ+ α)kˆt+1(i)
]
+ βφ
(
Etkˆt+2(i)− kˆt+1(i)
)
+ [1− β(1− δ)]Etµˆt+1 − (µ+ 1) [1− β (1− δ)]
µ(1− α) Etzˆt+1 + ιˆt − β(1− δ)Etιˆt+1.
(A17)
Integrating equation (A17) over all ﬁrms leads to the evolution of the aggregate capital stock,
λˆt + φ
(
kˆt+1 − kˆt
)
= β(1− δ)Etλˆt+1 +
(
1− β (1− δ)
µ(1− α)
) [
(µ+ 1)Etyˆt+1 − (µ+ α)kˆt+1
]
+βφ
(
Etkˆt+2 − kˆt+1
)
− (µ+ 1) [1− β (1− δ)]
µ(1− α) Etzˆt+1 + µˆt − β(1− δ)Etιˆt+1
+ [1− β(1− δ)]Etµˆt+1,
(A18)
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which is shown in equation (17) of the paper. Subtracting equation (A18) from equation
(A17) leads to following expression for ﬁrm i's capital stock in terms of the aggregate capital
stock,
φ
(
k˜t+1(i)− k˜t(i)
)
= βφ
(
Etk˜t+2(i)− k˜t+1(i)
)
+
[
1− β (1− δ)
µ(1− α)
] [
(µ+ 1)Et (yˆt+1(i)− yˆt+1)− (µ+ α)k˜t+1(i)
]
.
(A19)
A.2.4 Optimal pricing
The inﬂation indexation rule given in equation (20) can be re-written so that future prices
intermediate goods ﬁrms will charge while not being able to re-optimize their price can be
expressed in terms of the price chosen by the ﬁrm at time t. By repeated substitution of
equation (20), the price at time t+ T of good i can be expressed as,
pt+T (i) = pt(i) exp
(
γ
T−1∑
τ=0
pit+τ
)
,
For notational convenience, let pi∗t+T ≡
∑T−1
τ=0 pit+τ . Substitute the demand equation, (7), into
the proﬁt function, (19), to express the proﬁt only in terms of the intermediate good price,
pt(i), and aggregate state variables the ﬁrm cannot control:
Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
λt+T
λt

(
pt(i)e
γpi∗t+T
pt+T
)1−θ
yt+T − S
(pt(i)eγpi∗t+T
pt+T
)−θ
yt+T
 . (A20)
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to pt(i) is given by,
Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
λt+T
λt
(1− θ)
(
p∗t (i)e
γpi∗t+T
pt+T
)1−θ
+ θst+T (i)
(
p∗t (i)e
γpi∗t+T
pt+T
)−θ yt+Tp∗t (i) = 0,
(A21)
where p∗t (i) is the optimal price for a ﬁrm that is able to re-optimize its price. Since the ﬁrst
order condition cannot be rewritten in terms of inﬂation instead of prices, it is necessary to
assume prices have a steady state, which implies the steady state level of inﬂation is equal
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to zero. Before log-linearizing, it is convenient to rearrange equation (A21) as,
(1− θ)Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T λt+T
(
p∗t (i)e
γpi∗t+T
pt+T
)1−θ
yt+T =
−θEt
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T λt+T st+T (i)
(
p∗t (i)e
γpi∗t+T
pt+T
)−θ
yt+T ,
(A22)
then log-linearize each side of the equal sign separately. Log-linearizing the left hand side
and right hand size, respectively, yield,
(1− θ)λyEt
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
[
λˆt+T + yˆt+T + (1− θ)
(
pˆ∗t (i)− pˆt+T + γpi∗t+T
)]
, (A23)
−θλysEt
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
[
λˆt+T + yˆt+T + sˆt+T − θ
(
pˆ∗t (i)− pˆt+T + γpi∗t+T
)]
(A24)
where λ is the steady state marginal utility of income, y is the steady state level of output,
and s is the steady state marginal cost. Steady state marginal utility and steady output
cancel out from the left and right hand sides. The steady state marginal cost is found by
evaluating the ﬁrst order condition (A21) where λt = λ and p
∗
t (i) = pt = p for all t. In the
steady state equation (A21) simpliﬁes to,
(
1
1− ωβ
)
(1− θ + θs) y
p
= 0.
The steady state solution for s is given by,
s = −1− θ
θ
. (A25)
The coeﬃcient −θ s in equation (A24) therefore cancels out with 1 − θ in equation (A23).
Combining the left and right hand side then yields,
Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
[
pˆ∗t (i)− pˆt+T + γpi∗t+T − sˆt+T (i)
]
= 0 (A26)
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Solving for pˆ∗t (i) yields,
pˆ∗t (i) = (1− ωβ)Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
[
pˆt+T − γpi∗t+T + sˆt+T (i)
]
. (A27)
Substitute into equation (A27), the log-linearized the demand for intermediate good i at
time t+ T , which is given by,
yˆt+T (i) = −θ(pˆ∗t (i)− pˆt+T + γpi∗t+T ) + yˆt+T (A28)
and the marginal cost given in equation (A14). This leads to an expression for the optimal
price for ﬁrm i in terms of aggregate variables and the ﬁrm's expected future capital,
pˆ∗t (i) = (1− ωβ)Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
{
pˆt+T − γpi∗t+T + sˆt+T −
θ (1 + αµ)
µ(1− α)
[
pˆ∗t (i)− pˆt+T + γpi∗t+T
]}
− (1− ωβ)Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
{
α (µ+ 1)
µ(1− α) k˜t+T (i)
}
.
(A29)
The solution of this equation for pˆ∗t (i) is given by,
pˆ∗t (i) = (1− ωβ)Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
[
pˆt+T − γpi∗t+T + ψsˆt+T −
ψα(µ+ 1)
µ(1− α) k˜t+T (i)
]
, (A30)
where
ψ =
[
1 +
θ(1 + αµ)
µ(1− α)
]−1
.
Equation (A30) can be rewritten as the ﬁrst order diﬀerence equation:
pˆ∗t (i) = ωβEtpˆ
∗
t+1(i) + (1− ωβ)
(
pˆt + ψsˆt − ψα(µ+ 1)
µ(1− α) k˜t(i)
)
, (A31)
where Etpˆ
∗
t+1(i) denotes the expectation at time t for the time t+1 optimal decision for the
ﬁrm's new price, conditional that the ﬁrm is able to re-optimize its price again in period
t+ 1. Note, this is not the same as the unconditional time t expectation of the ﬁrm's price
in period t + 1. Since with probability ω the ﬁrm will not be able to re-optimize its price
Empirical Signiﬁcance of Learning with Firm-Speciﬁc Capital 42
next period, the unconditional expectation for ﬁrm i's price in period t+ 1 is given by,
Etpˆt+1(i) = ω [pˆ
∗
t (i) + γpit−1] + (1− ω)Etpˆ∗t+1(i). (A32)
A.2.5 Phillips Curve Solution
Deriving the Phillips curve when there is ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital is substantially more compli-
cated than a model without capital or with a perfect capital rental market. Equation (A31)
shows that each ﬁrm's optimal price will depend on its capital stock relative to the aggregate
capital stock. Since a ﬁrm's capital stock is dependent on its entire investment history, the
optimal price will depend on the ﬁrm's entire history of being able to re-optimize its price.
The convenient result from the previous section that each ﬁrm will choose the same price
does not hold when there is ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital and Calvo pricing.
Equation (A29) implicitly deﬁnes the optimal choice for the price of intermediate good
i in terms of expectations of aggregate variables and the following expectation of the ﬁrm's
future relative capital stocks:
Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T k˜t+T (i) (A33)
To derive the Phillips curve, we must rewrite the above expression in terms of the ﬁrm's
current capital stock, the current optimal price, and expectations of aggregate variables.
The optimal choice for k˜t+1(i) in terms of expected future output is given in equation (A19).
Substituting the log-linear demand for yt+1(i) into equation (A19) leads to,
φ
(
k˜t+1(i)− k˜t(i)
)
= βφ
(
Etk˜t+2(i)− k˜t+1(i)
)
−
[
1− β (1− δ)
µ(1− α)
] [
θ(µ+ 1)Etp˜t+1(i)− (µ+ α)k˜t+1(i)
]
.
(A34)
where p˜t+1(i) = pˆt+1(i)− pˆt+1 is the relative price of intermediate good i in period t+1. The
rational expectations solution for (A34) must have the form,
k˜t+1(i) = mk˜t(i) + np˜t(i), (A35)
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where m and n are determined by the method of undetermined coeﬃcients in the next
subsection. For a ﬁrm re-optimizing their price, this equation can be rewritten as
k˜t+1(i) = mk˜t(i) + npˆ
∗
t (i)− npˆt(i). (A36)
Substituting this into equation (A33) shows that,
Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T k˜t+T+1(i) = mEt
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T k˜t+T (i) +
n
1− ωβ pˆ
∗
t (i)− nEt
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T pˆt+T .
Multiply both sides of this equation by (ωβ) then add k˜t(i) to both sides in order to make
the summation on the left hand side identical to the summation on the right hand side.
Doing this yields,
Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T k˜t+T (i) = ωβmEt
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T k˜t+T (i)+
ωβn
1− ωβ pˆ
∗
t (i)−ωβnEt
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T pˆt+T+k˜t(i).
Solving this equation yields,
Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T k˜t+T (i) =
1
1− ωβm
[
ωβn
1− ωβ pˆ
∗
t (i) + k˜t(i)− ωβnEt
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T pˆt+T
]
. (A37)
Substituting this into equation (A29) and solving for pˆ∗t (i) leads to the following solution,
pˆ∗t (i) = (1− ωβ)Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
(
pˆt+T − γpi∗t+T + νsˆt+T
)
− αν(µ+ 1)(1− ωβ)
µ(1− α)(1− ωβm) k˜t(i), (A38)
where,
ν =
[
1 +
θ(1 + αµ)
µ(1− α) +
αωβn(µ+ 1)
µ(1− α)(1− ωβm)
]
.
Equation (A38) expresses the optimal price of intermediate good i solely in terms of aggregate
variables and the ﬁrm's current relative capital stock. Since the capital stock was chosen in
the previous period, it is independent of whether or not a ﬁrm is currently able to re-optimize
its price. Therefore the average capital stock among ﬁrms re-optimizing their price is equal
to the average capital stock in the economy. This implies that average value for k˜t(i) over
ﬁrms re-optimizing their price is equal to zero. Let pˆ∗t denote the average price among these
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ﬁrms. Equation (A38) implies,
pˆ∗t = (1− ωβ)Et
∞∑
T=0
(ωβ)T
(
pˆt+T − γpi∗t+T + νsˆt+T
)
. (A39)
This can be rewritten as the ﬁrst order diﬀerence equation,
pˆ∗t = ωβEtpˆ
∗
t+1 + (1− ωβ) (pˆt + νsˆt) . (A40)
Substituting equation (A39) into (A40) to eliminate pˆ∗t and Etpˆ
∗
t+1 leads to the Phillips curve,
pit =
(
1
1 + βγ
)
[γpit−1 + βEtpit+1 + κsˆt] , (A41)
where,
κ =
(1− ω)(1− ωβ)
νω
.
A.2.6 Method of Undetermined Coeﬃcients
This subsection uses the method of undetermined coeﬃcients to compute the values of m
and n in equation (A36) which must satisfy the optimality condition for capital given in
equation (A34). Equation (A34) can be rearranged as,
k˜t+1(i) = k˜t(i) + βEtk˜t+2(i)− ζ0Etp˜t+1(i)− ζ1k˜t+1(i), (A42)
where ζ0 and ζ1 are given by,
ζ0 =
θ (µ+ 1) [1− β (1− δ)]
µφ (1− α)
ζ1 = β +
(1 + αµ) [1− β (1− δ)]
µφ (1− α)
I begin by ﬁnding an expression for Etp˜t+1(i) in terms of k˜t(i) and p˜t(i). Using equation
(A32), the expected relative price can be rewritten as,
Etp˜t+1(i) = Etpˆt+1(i)− Etpˆt+1 = ωpˆt(i) + (1− ω)Etpˆ∗t+1(i)− Etpˆt+1 (A43)
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In order to express p˜t+1(i) only in terms of p˜t(i) and k˜t(i), we must next ﬁnd a solution for
pˆ∗t (i). According to equation (A31), the rational expectation solution for pˆ
∗
t (i) must take the
form,
pˆ∗t (i) = f(pˆt, sˆt) + ak˜t(i), (A44)
where f(·) is a linear function of aggregate variables and a needs to be determined by the
method of undetermined coeﬃcients. Let Lt denote the set of ﬁrms re-optimizing their price
in period t. The average price of the ﬁrms who are able to re-optimize their price is given
by,
pˆ∗t =
1
1− ω
∫
i∈Lt
pˆ∗t (i)di = f(pˆt, sˆt) +
a
1− ω
∫
i∈Lt
k˜t(i)di
Since k˜t(i) was chosen in period t − 1, it is independent of whether a ﬁrm is re-optimizing
its price. Therefore the average diﬀerence between a ﬁrm's capital stock and the aggregate
capital stock among ﬁrms re-optimizing their price is equal to zero. Therefore,
pˆ∗t = f(pˆt, sˆt),
and equation (A44) can be rewritten as,
pˆ∗t (i) = pˆ
∗
t + ak˜t(i). (A45)
Advancing equation (A45) one period and taking expectations yields,
Etpˆ
∗
t+1(i) = Etpˆ
∗
t+1 + ak˜t+1(i), (A46)
where Etpˆ
∗
t+1 is the expected average price over ﬁrms that can re-optimize their price next
period. This can be rewritten in terms of the expected aggregate price level. Since a fraction
ω ﬁrms will not be able to change their price next period and the remaining 1−ω ﬁrms will
have an average price pˆ∗t+1, the expected price level next period is given by,
Etpˆt+1 = ωpˆt + (1− ω)Etpˆ∗t+1. (A47)
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Solving (A47) for Etpˆ
∗
t+1 and substituting this expression into (A46) leads to,
Etpˆ
∗
t+1(i) =
1
1− ω (Etpˆt+1 − ωpˆt) + ak˜t+1(i). (A48)
Substituting equation (A36) for k˜t+1(i) yields,
Etpˆ
∗
t+1(i) =
1
1− ω (Etpˆt+1 − ωpˆt) + amk˜t(i)− anp˜t(i). (A49)
Plugging this into equation (A43) leads to an expression for Etp˜t+1(i) in terms of p˜t(i) and
k˜t(i),
Etp˜t+1(i) = [ω + (1− ω) an] p˜t(i) + (1− ω) amk˜t(i) (A50)
Next, using equation (A36), the expected future capital stock is given by,
Etk˜t+2(i) = m
2k˜t(i) +mnp˜t(i) + nEtp˜t+1(i) (A51)
Substituting equation (A50) into equation (A51) leads to an expression for Etk˜t+2(i) in terms
of p˜t(i) and k˜t(i),
Etk˜t+2(i) =
[
m2 + amn (1− ω)
]
k˜t(i) +
[
mn+ nω + an2(1− ω)
]
p˜t(i) (A52)
Plugging in equations (A50), (A51), and (A36) into (A42) leads to an expression for capital
of the form given in equation (A36) where m and n must satisfy, respectively,
βm2 + [βan(1− ω)− ζ1 − ζ0a(1− ω)− 1]m+ 1 = 0, (A53)
βa(1− ω)n2 + [βm+ βω − ζ1 − ζ0a(1− ω)− 1]n− ζ0ω = 0. (A54)
All that remains is to ﬁnd an expression for a, also using the method of undetermined
coeﬃcients. Substituting the expression for Etpˆ
∗
t+1(i) given in equation (A49) into equation
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(A31) and solving for pˆ∗t (i) yields,
pˆ∗t (i) =
1
1− ωβan
(
ωβam− ψα (µ+ 1)
µ(1− α)
)
k˜t(i)
+
ωβ
(1− ω) (1− ωβan) (Etpˆt+1 − ωpˆt) + pˆt +
ψ
1− ωβansˆt,
(A55)
which implies a must satisfy the quadratic equation,
ωβna2 + (ωβm− 1) a− αψ(µ+ 1)
µ(1− α) = 0. (A56)
Equations (A53), (A54), and (A56) make up a system of quadratic equations that jointly
determine the values for m, n, and a in terms of the parameters of the model. Since this is a
system of three quadratic equations, there are potentially eight solutions, but these equations
alone do not rule out economically infeasible outcomes. Equations (A35) and (A50) can be
rewritten as the following dynamic system:
 k˜t+1(i)
Etp˜t+1(i)
 =
 m n
ω + (1− ω)an 1− ω

 k˜t(i)
p˜t(i)
 . (A57)
The economically feasible solution for m, n, and a must be consistent with stable means
and variances of each ﬁrm's relative capital stock and relative price. The system is stable if
and only if the eigenvalues of the matrix in equation (A57) are inside the unit circle. The
eigenvalues are given by,
e1 =
1
2
(
m+ ω + (1− ω)an+
√
[m+ ω + (1− ω)an]2 − 4mω
)
e2 =
1
2
(
m+ ω + (1− ω)an−
√
[m+ ω + (1− ω)an]2 − 4mω
)
It is evident from these equations that e1 > e2. Therefore both eigenvalues will be less than
1 in absolute value if and only if e1 < 1 and e2 > −1. The condition on the ﬁrst eigenvalue
implies, √
[m+ ω + (1− ω)an]2 − 4mω < 2−m− ω − (1− ω)an. (A58)
Empirical Signiﬁcance of Learning with Firm-Speciﬁc Capital 48
Since the left hand side of the inequality is always positive, the left hand side must also be
positive. Therefore, squaring both sides preserves the direction of the inequality. Doing this
yields,
[m+ ω + (1− ω)an]2 − 4mω < 4− 4 [m+ ω + (1− ω)an] + 4 [m+ ω + (1− ω)an]2 (A59)
This inequality does not preserve the restriction implied in (A58) that the right hand side
be positive. Therefore (A58) also implies
2−m− ω − (1− ω)an > 0. (A60)
The inequalities (A59) and (A60) simplify to, respectively,
m < 1− an (A61)
m < 1 + (1− ω)(1− an) (A62)
The stability condition for the second eigenvalue is,
√
[m+ ω + (1− ω)an]2 − 4mω < 2 +m+ ω + (1− ω)an,
which simpliﬁes to,
m > −1− 1− ω
1 + ω
an (A63)
Finally, the coeﬃcients m, n, and a can be found by the solving the system of quadratic
equations (A53), (A54), and (A56), subject to the inequalities (A61), (A62), and (A63).
A.3 Market clearing
Goods market clearing implies total output of the ﬁnal good is equal to aggregate consump-
tion plus aggregate investment,
yt = ct + It.
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Log-linearizing this yields,
yˆt = cy cˆt + δky Iˆt, (A64)
where cy is the steady state consumption to output ratio and ky is the steady state capital
to output ratio. The steady state capital to output ratio is found by combining the steady
state ﬁrst order condition for capital rental, given in equation (A6), and the steady state
ﬁrst order condition for investment, given in equation (A15). Evaluating equation (A6) at
the steady state and using the steady state marginal cost, given in equation (A25), yields,
ρ = α
θ − 1
θ
(
y
k
)
.
Evaluating equation (A15) at the steady state yields,
1 = β (ρ+ 1− δ) .
Combining these equations to eliminate ρ leads to the following capital to output ratio,
ky =
βα(θ − 1)
θ (1− β + βδ) (A65)
Evaluating the goods market clearing condition, (A64), at the steady state yields the follow-
ing consumption to output ratio,
cy = 1− δky. (A66)
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Figure 1: Forecast Errors
Case 1: Rational Expectations
Consumption Investment Inﬂation Fed Funds
Case 2: Learing with RE Initial Conditions
Consumption (0.9467) Investment (0.8525) Inﬂation (0.9235) Fed Funds (0.9512)
Case 3: Learing with RE Initial Conditions, Shocks Unobservable
Consumption (0.9922) Investment (0.8598) Inﬂation (0.6517) Fed Funds (0.9474)
Case 4: Learning with Unobservable Shocks and Pre-Sample Initial Conditions
Consumption (0.7003) Investment (0.4776) Inﬂation (0.6457) Fed Funds (0.6882)
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Figure 2: Out of Sample Multiperiod Forecast Errors
Consumption Investment
Inﬂation Federal Funds Rate
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Figure 3: Preference Shock Impulse Responses
Case 1: Rational Expectations
Consumption Investment Inﬂation Interest Rate
Case 2: Learning with RE Initial Conditions
Consumption Investment Inﬂation Interest Rate
Case 3: Learning with Unobservable Shocks and RE Initial Conditions
Consumption Investment Inﬂation Interest Rate
Case 4: Learning with Unobservable Shocks and Pre-Sample Initial Conditions
Consumption Investment Inﬂation Interest Rate
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Figure 4: Technology Shock Impulse Responses
Case 1: Rational Expectations
Consumption Investment Inﬂation Interest Rate
Case 2: Learning with RE Initial Conditions
Consumption Investment Inﬂation Interest Rate
Case 3: Learning with Unobservable Shocks and RE Initial Conditions
Consumption Investment Inﬂation Interest Rate
Case 4: Learning with Unobservable Shocks and Pre-Sample Initial Conditions
Consumption Investment Inﬂation Interest Rate
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Figure 5: Investment Shock Impulse Responses
Case 1: Rational Expectations
Consumption Investment Inﬂation Interest Rate
Case 2: Learning with RE Initial Conditions
Consumption Investment Inﬂation Interest Rate
Case 3: Learning with Unobservable Shocks and RE Initial Conditions
Consumption Investment Inﬂation Interest Rate
Case 4: Learning with Unobservable Shocks and Pre-Sample Initial Conditions
Consumption Investment Inﬂation Interest Rate
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Figure 6: Monetary Policy Shock Impulse Responses
Case 1: Rational Expectations
Consumption Investment Inﬂation Interest Rate
Case 2: Learning with RE Initial Conditions
Consumption Investment Inﬂation Interest Rate
Case 3: Learning with Unobservable Shocks and RE Initial Conditions
Consumption Investment Inﬂation Interest Rate
Case 4: Learning with Unobservable Shocks and Pre-Sample Initial Conditions
Consumption Investment Inﬂation Interest Rate
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Figure 7: Smoothed Estimates of Structural Shocks
Case 1: Rational Expectations
Preference Technology Investment Monetary Policy
Case 2: Learning with RE Initial Conditions
Preference (0.8708) Technology (0.0826) Investment (0.5076) Monetary Policy (0.7246)
Case 3: Learning with Unobservable Shocks and RE Initial Conditions
Preference (0.8301) Technology (0.7917) Investment (-0.1270) Monetary Policy (0.2623)
Case 4: Learning with Unobservable Shocks and Pre-Sample Initial Conditions
Preference (-0.0413) Technology (0.7501) Investment (-0.0976) Monetary Policy (0.4380)
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Table 2: Model Fit Comparisons
Root Mean Squared Error
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Consumption 110.6570 87.6595 106.8923 143.3313
Investment 99.9744 105.0477 87.0809 132.0726
Inﬂation 2.6073 2.4222 3.1500 2.9596
Federal Funds Rate 1.3661 1.3930 1.3714 1.9271
Autocorrelation Squared Error
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Consumption -0.0048 0.0385 -0.0179 0.4449
Investment 0.0695 0.0925 -0.0297 0.3853
Inﬂation 0.2563 0.1517 0.4053 0.1026
Federal Funds Rate 0.4491 0.3866 0.3717 0.0304
